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SOVEREIGN DEBT AND CRAs: WHERE DOES THE POWER LIE? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This work project analyzes how changes in sovereign debt rating within 
Europe can affect the stock performance of the event country, and which are 
the factors that influence this impact. We found a significant impact made 
by both positive and negative watchlisting, while upgrades entail a 
significant downward reaction when they are preceded by watchlist activity. 
A further analysis of this impact allowed us to identify a surprise effect, 
composed by the presence of warning, the level of discussion and whether 
other agencies previously implemented the same action. Assuming the semi-
strong form of market efficiency holds, these findings suggest CRAs are 
considered to disclose private information. 
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 1. Introduction - General Overview 
Past 20 years showed a periodical intensification of attention towards Credit Rating 
Agencies (CRAs), particularly during periods of crisis. Many people started to ask 
whether the presence of mainly US-based independent organizations, controlling the 
ability of a Sovereign State to gather credit, would enhance their power over reasonable 
level; moreover, if this could generate conflict of interests. Nowadays, because of the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis, the debate reached a new peak. As already happened 
during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, people started considering if the action of the 
CRAs, namely the downgrading and negative outlook, was partially responsible for the 
spiral of fear within the financial markets. What really matters is what kind of sentiment 
these announcements are able to generate within the markets. If we consider the semi-
strong form of market efficiency, markets only react when a previously private 
information becomes public. If CRAs disclose private information, this would give 
them discretional power to generate turbulence within the markets. 
Consider a simple example: on November 10
th
 2011, S&P mistakenly reported a 
downgrade for the French triple A rating, somehow anticipating future action, to be 
taken on January 13
th
 2012. This generated two effects: on one side the AMF (Autorité 
des marchés financiers) and French government furiously turned against the Agency, on 
the other French 10-year bond yield increased 27 basis points on the day, leading the 
spread over German Bund to increase up to 168 basis points, one of the largest figure of 
the euro era
1
. S&P reported this was only a technical error; nonetheless it strongly 
influenced market movements. If we compare it to the effect the actual downgrade had 
on French bond yield (only 4 basis points increase), the incredible impact an unexpected 
                                                 
1 Source: “Financial Times” – November 10
th
, 2011 
2
 Hereby this definition includes both the actual changes and positive/negative announcements.  
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announcement by the CRAs can have becomes obvious. This work project enters this 
discussion with the specific aim to analyze how financial markets react to particular 
news from CRAs. Specifically, we empirically investigate the two following research 
questions: how the stock market reacts to sovereign rating announcements; and how this 
reaction is related to the surprise effect within the markets, namely when and how prices 
incorporate the news announcements. 
Our major findings highlight that CRAs have strong influences over domestic market. 
We found that negative announcements are associated with significant downward 
effects in the stock market around the event day. On the other hand, we find that 
upgrade announcements are also related to negative stock market reactions, and such 
negative reactions are particularly related to previous positive watchlisting by the 
CRAs. We argue that this pattern seems to be a counterbalance of the previous 
overreaction caused by the watchlisting. Moreover, wider impact of watchlist changes 
compared to actual rating variations is persistent in all cases. When analyzing how does 
the surprise element affect the reaction, we found an amplified effect in case of widely 
discussed (which in our model means unexpected) negative news. Positive unexpected 
announcements seem to be characterized by price stickiness to a certain threshold in the 
short run. Furthermore, upgrades are significantly affected by the presence of similar 
action by another Agency, and the above mentioned negative impact over upgrades of 
previous watchlist actions is hereby confirmed. The overall picture drawn by these 
surprise factors leads us to the insight that CRAs are likely to be considered to disclose 
private information, an important starting point in the discussion of what role should 
they have within financial markets in the future.  
Our research differs from previous literature in the following aspects. First, different 
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from earlier studies (Michaelides, Milidonis et al., 2012; Cantor & Packer, 1996) who 
examine the CRA announcement effects in global markets, our case is narrowed down 
to European countries, and the benchmark to be used for comparison is hereby 
identified by the European MSCI Index. Second, we employ several new proxies for 
market surprises, such as the level of discussion around the topic, incorporated by the 
number of Bloomberg News, the presence of previous corresponding watchlist 
movements, and whether another Agency already implemented the same action. Third, 
we reached, among others, completely original conclusions, in particular about 
upgrades.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. After this brief introduction, Section Two 
includes a simple literature review, clarifying the starting point of this study, and 
showing results previous literature already reached. In Section Three, the focus will be 
pointed towards the empirical dataset, and what is the implication it had in the 
upcoming study. The fourth section focuses on descriptive analysis regarding both 
simple and abnormal returns. The fifth section explains in detail the regression results. 
And the last section will draw a general picture of what has been found, and how this 
can vary the way we assume CRAs behave. 
 
2.  A Brief Literature Review 
Rating literature, starting from the 90s, has been developing in two main directions. On 
one side, many studies tried to figure out what are the determinants of Sovereign Debt 
Rating; namely, they analyzed if movements of specific macroeconomic factors can 
explain rating variations. Cantor & Packer (1996) were pioneers in this kind of studies. 
In a famous paper, they identified six influential factors: per capita income, GDP 
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growth, inflation, external debt, level of economic development and default history. A. 
Afonso (2003) reached equivalent results, testing also prediction error trend according 
to linear and logistic transformations: conclusions demonstrate the latter outperforms 
the former, meaning low rating moves quicker than high rating, since requirements are 
less demanding. This kind of predictive model has been used also to back-test whether 
CRAs were able to predict financial crises, and if they just accordingly reacted or 
massively increased the related effects. N. Mora (2005), along the lines of Ferri et al. 
(1999), criticizes CRAs' behavior during the Asian financial crisis, defining the rating 
actions in excess of what predicted, and moreover sticky after the crisis period. Being 
the ratings sticky, the authors conclude they probably do not give much new information 
to the market, because they only react to adjust their own perspective to the current 
market conditions. These results contrast with the predictions from Cantor & Packer 
(1996): they show announcements by the CRAs have considerable market impact on 
bond yield.  
This directly connects to the second direction in which rating studies have been 
evolving, which is exactly where this work project comes in: analyzing mainly through 
event studies the impact of rating variations over bonds and stocks. We should mention 
the first papers concerned mainly corporate debt ratings (Hand, Holthausen & Leftwich, 
1992), even if later, driven by historical events like the Mexican, the Asian and the latest 
Global financial crises, the focus moved to sovereign debt (Cantor & Packer, 1996; 
Steiner & Heinke, 2001; Kiff, Nowak & Schumacher, 2012; Michaelides, Milidonis, 
Nishiotis & Papakyriacou, 2012). Most of these academic studies, even if through 
different frameworks, reaches similar conclusions for the whole sample, which 
generally includes countries from all over the World: asymmetry between upgrades and 
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downgrades
2
, where only the latter presents significant and temporary abnormal returns, 
due to CRAs’ action, while the former does not have similar impact. This work project 
partially builds up on these conclusions. On one side the focus is narrowed down to 
Europe, but, as next paragraphs will show, on the other further analysis on upgrades 
revealed the possibility for a positive market overreaction to positive announcements, to 
be counterbalanced in the moment of the actual rating variation. 
The topic regarding general market reaction to CRAs’ actions was followed also by 
interesting specifications, concerning for example the spillover effect over emerging 
markets (Kaminsky & Scmukler, 2002), international markets in general (Gande & 
Parsley, 2004; Ferreira & Gama, 2007) or among European countries within the current 
European Sovereign Debt crisis (Arezki, Candelon et al., 2011; Brutti & Sauré, 2011). 
Even if the subject of this study focuses only on the event country, without directly 
considering spillover effect, the asymmetric reaction between upgrades and downgrades 
that these papers jointly reveal, not only is in line with our solutions, as discussed 
above, but does represent a powerful magnifier of the effect CRAs have on the market, 
especially in period of heavy crisis, like the one we are currently in.  
 
3. Data 
We start by defining the event days on which the events occurred. Through Bloomberg 
software, a database listing all CRAs' actions (upgrades and downgrades) and watchlist 
changes
3
 (upward and downward) was created, both considering long-term debt ratings 
                                                 
2
 Hereby this definition includes both the actual changes and positive/negative announcements.  
3
 According to CRAs’ definition, a credit issuer is put on Watchlist, or CreditWatch, if “events or 
circumstances occur that may affect a credit rating in the near term” (S&P), if “a rating is under review 
for possible change in the short-term” (Moody’s), and if “there is a heightened probability of a rating 
change… generally resolved over a relatively short period” (Fitch). The main difference with Rating 
Outlook is the time horizon, since the latter represents a long-time (6 months to 2 year) direction. 
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in local currency. In this way 207 observations were identified from 16 countries, 
including 12 members of the Eurozone (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain), 3 countries only in 
the European Union (Denmark, Sweden, UK), and 1 more only in the European 
Economic Area (Norway). Since positive and negative actions are supposed to 
differently affect stock financial markets, the overall sample was divided in 132 
negative events (80 downgrades and 52 negative watchlist) and 75 positive events (62 
upgrades and 13 positive watchlist). This events list considers only the three largest 
CRAs (S&P, Fitch and Moody's), given that both regulators and previous literature 
rarely include other rating companies in their considerations. This is due to the 
incredible relevance these three agencies have on investors, since, for example, they are 
responsible for 98% of all outstanding ratings among the agencies recognized by the 
SEC (Security and Exchange Commission)
4
. 
Given these events, two other kinds of data were required. First of all, in order to 
inspect the market reactions to the ratings news, we calculate the abnormal market 
returns around the event days. In the process of calculating daily abnormal returns, 
historical returns of both the MSCI Index for each Event Country and the MSCI Europe 
Index were collected. These data include two window periods around each event:         
[-250;-1] and [-20;+20]. The former is considered to incorporate market trends before 
the event
5
, while the latter represents a reasonable amount of time
6
 to check for 
                                                                                                                                               
- Source: Company Websites: 
http://img.en25.com/Web/StandardandPoors/SP_CreditRatingsGuide.pdf 
http://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/ratings/fitch_ratings_definitions_and_scales.pdf 
http://www.moodys.com/sites/products/AboutMoodysRatingsAttachments/MoodysRatingsSymbolsa
nd%20Definitions.pdf 
4
 2008 SEC NRSRO (National Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations) Report.  
5
 We believe that including 250 days prior the event not only allows to have enough information about the 
market, but also permits to distinguish among different time periods, since each of them may be related 
to different drivers of interest. 
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significant consequences related to the CRAs’ action. However, we believe that there 
could be high covariance between the MSCI Europe index and the individual country 
index for several reasons. First, certain country stock indices could be highly correlated 
with the MSCI Europe index because the former take up substantial weights in the 
calculation of the latter. Second, ratings news may cause a spill-over reaction at the pan-
European level, more than simply at country level.  Therefore our specification for the 
abnormal return might be downward biased. Hence we use two specifications for the 
stocks returns: the abnormal market returns of the respective country around the event 
day, as well as the simple stock index returns. 
Then, in order to deepen the understanding of the role of CRAs in relation to market 
efficiency, another set of data was gathered, to be used as a proxy for the likelihood of 
the news to be expected or not: the number of news published by Bloomberg related to 
the topic of interest in a 7-day time window after the event. The rationale behind this 
proxy is straightforward: the less anticipated a piece of news is, the more discussion it 
would provoke. In this way it becomes possible to highlight the presence of correlation 
between cumulative abnormal returns and the degree of expectation within the markets. 
 
4. Descriptive Analysis 
4.1 Using simple index returns around the event day 
Table 1 reports the overall conclusion derived from our descriptive analysis. In order to 
provide a better understanding of the relation between simple and abnormal returns, the 
above mentioned table presents the former in Panel A and Panel B, and the latter in 
Panel C and Panel D. Notice each type of returns is further divided according to its 
                                                                                                                                               
6
 Even if the [-20; +20] windows is one of the most common in this kind of analysis (see Michaelides, 
Milidonis et al., 2012), other studies use different time periods, like [-10; +10] (Kaminsky & 
Schmukler, 2002), [-30; +20] (Cantor & Parker 1996) or even [-180; +180] (Steiner & Heinke, 2001). 
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relation to negative or positive announcements concerning the sovereign rating, and 
then four event windows are taken in consideration: two of them are connected to 
immediate market reaction (the event day, 0, and [-1; +1]), and the remaining widen the 
analysis to larger periods, in particular [-5; +5] and [-20; +20]. Moreover, 
acknowledging the influence that being previously moved in positive or negative 
watchlist can have at the moment an actual rating variation occurs, we further divided 
this category in two branches: they differ in such a way the first one includes those 
rating changes anticipated by a watchlist action in previous 6 months. This section will 
focus on simple returns, while next will move the discussion to abnormal returns.  
Looking at Table 1, some of the average returns present statistical significance. This is 
the case of the [-1; +1] window, reporting a negative return of -1.04% after a country is 
put under negative watchlist (significant at 10% level). This means such an action has a 
negative impact on domestic stock markets, in particular in the short run. Moving to 
positive announcements, we can see in Panel B how upgrades preceded by positive 
watchlist are characterized by significant negative returns in the short run, both in the 
event day, with a return of -0.41%, significant at 5%, and in [-1; +1], with a return of -
0.62% significant at 10%. This implies an upgrade can generate a negative reaction by 
the market. Even if this seems counterintuitive, once we consider this effect does not 
appear in case of upgrades without previous warning, we can hypothesize this may be 
due to an overestimation by the market at the moment of the watchlisting action, to be 
counterbalanced when the rating actually increases. This conclusion can be even more 
appreciated if we start dealing with positive watchlist movements. This kind of 
announcement in our results is linked to impressive positive cumulative returns, 
reaching 2.93% in [-5; +5] with a statistical significance of 10%, and so much as 8.49% 
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in [-20; +20] with a statistical significance of 1%. 
To complete this part of the descriptive analysis, we provide a graphical approach as 
well in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The main reason is to understand the returns behavior 
over the all period of 20 days before and after the event, even if there may be a lack of 
statistical significance. Moreover, this will allow us to easily compare the results 
concerning abnormal returns. As a matter of fact, looking at results from the following 
section, we noticed that the patterns of the two types of returns are very similar. To 
avoid duplication, and given the higher importance of abnormal returns in the long run, 
we decided to only provide comments to these patterns in next section. 
 
4.2 Using abnormal returns around the event day 
Panel C and Panel D from Table 1 present the descriptive analysis of abnormal returns 
(see Appendix for information about data generation). The rationale behind calculating 
abnormal returns is the likelihood of simple returns to be driven by general market 
conditions. This kind of effect is clearly amplified the longer the event window is. For 
this reason we tried to eliminate external trends, and gather in such a way insights 
related only to the domestic market. 
The results obtained from abnormal returns presents only few differences from the ones 
in Panel A and Panel B. In Panel C we observe that negative watchlisting is related in 
the very short term to negative abnormal returns, -0.41% in the event day and -0.85% in 
[-1; +1]; in both cases they are supported by statistical significance at 5% level. Moving 
to Panel C, the negative impact of upgrades anticipated by positive watchlist is 
confirmed, and now it has significance for all the event windows. In particular, these 
positive announcements are characterized by negative abnormal of -0.51% in the event 
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day and of -1.11% in [-1; +1] (both significant at 10%); of -2.34% in [-5; +5] 
(significant at 5%); of -6.46% in [-20; +20] (significant at 1%). This confirms the 
previous hypothesis of overreaction to positive watchlist, even if in this case the market 
seems to go down after an upgrade even further than the positive variation due to 
watchlisting, meaning the effect is amplified. As far as concerning the overestimation 
effect in Panel C, as already happened when analyzing simple returns, average abnormal 
returns confirm its presence, however, since it is not supported by statistical significance 
in any case, its role is less relevant. 
Previous literature including event studies often goes with a graphical analysis, to 
observe the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) impact over the entire event window. 
In order to compare our conclusions to other academic papers, and following the same 
structure of previous section, Figure 3 to 6 identify the movements of CARs around the 
event day in case of both positive and negative announcements. In particular, we added 
to previous section graphical framework also the overall impact of generic positive and 
negative announcements, considering altogether rating and watchlist changes
7
.  
Figure 3 represents the CAR for all kind of negative CRAs’ actions; in this case results 
are consistent with both Steiner & Heinke (2001) and Michaelides, Milidonis et al. 
(2012). The implied message is straightforward: market presents a strong reaction, both 
pre-announcement and post-announcement, to this kind of news. In particular, even if 
the effect seems to last, what really surprises is the temporary deep jump immediately 
close to the event day, to be recovered in part in the following days. Figure 4 
decomposes this impact according to Table 1 structure. The conclusion is consistent 
with what has been previously said: negative watchlist have an important negative 
                                                 
7
 This was due to provide a consistent comparison with Michaelides, Milidonis et al. (2012). 
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impact on markets, while no significant trend emerges if we look at downgrades, both 
with and without a prior threat
8
. 
Moving to Figure 5, the preannouncement situation is in line with previous literature, 
showing minor, non-significant positive CARs. It definitely changes when dealing with 
the post announcement phase: instead of remaining around 0, the CARs from day 5 
present a deep downward trend, leading to negative results up to day 20. We already 
discussed what may be the rationale behind this negative effect, and previous 
considerations have an even easier visual explanation when we take a look at Figure 6, 
which deals with the different kinds of actions related with positive announcements. The 
figure makes it clear there are three separate trends. Positive watchlist movements 
belong to the first group, and they are related to positive CARs in the entire sample, 
particularly in the post announcement phase. The second sample, which includes 
upgrades without warning, perfectly reflects results from similar event studies: the line 
is flat, and CARs are not significantly different from zero. Third, upgrades preceded by 
watchlist movements represent the line with negative slope after the event day: this is 
what we previously defined as an overestimation effect, and visually shows the negative 
impact an upgrade can generate on domestic markets, in specific situations. 
 
The results from the two sets of simple and abnormal returns, even if partially 
correlated, have clearly distinctive characteristics. In particular, simple returns do not 
succeed in explaining the results concerning cumulative returns, which become highly 
dependent on the corresponding European situation when we consider a large enough 
event window; this becomes clear when we compare the corresponding graphs from 
                                                 
8
 We define moving the rating into negative watchlist as threat of downgrading. 
14 
 
abnormal returns. For this reason we concluded that, while simple returns may be 
appropriate in the valuation of short term effects, abnormal returns are a better fit when 
dealing with cumulative returns in longer windows. 
 
5. Regression Analysis 
5.1 Methodology 
The second part of the work project seeks for correlation between stock market returns 
and the degree of surprise caused by the event. The aim here is to understand the 
behavior of CRAs, and to distinguish if they only incorporate information already 
available to the market, or they disclose private information. In particular, once we 
assume they have an impact on markets, if the surprise element includes a big part of 
this reaction, it means markets are driven by the acknowledgement of previously private 
information, once we assume the semi-strong form of market efficiency holds. 
However, this would rise the doubt of whether CRAs should be allowed to incorporate 
such a transmission mechanism. For this reason a simple linear regression analysis, 
decomposing the effect of rating variation on returns in various elements, is performed 
according to the equation:  
 𝑅𝑖 = 𝛾 + 𝛿 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖 + 𝜋 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝜔 ∗ 𝑊𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝜌 ∗ 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑖 + 𝜇 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖 +   [1] 
The dependent variable, 𝑅𝑖, is the stock market return. As we have defined earlier, it 
takes multiple specifications, according to whether it considers daily or cumulative, 
simple or abnormal returns, and what event window it includes. The constant, γ, 
captures the impact of the event on the stock price. We expect γ to be significantly 
positive for positive announcements and significantly negative for negative 
announcements, which would imply stock markets react accordingly to the news 
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direction, once we get rid of all the other variable components.  
We use three variables to measure the unexpectedness of the ratings change. News is the 
number of related news published by Bloomberg within a week after the event day. We 
expect this variable to behave as a magnifying glass for returns, which implies the 
coefficients would show consistent trends with the results we highlighted in the 
descriptive analysis for each of the corresponding event window. In addition, dummy 
variable First shows whether there was in the previous three months an action in the 
same direction by a different CRA, separately considering rating variations and 
watchlist movements. We expect that this component presents not only coefficients in 
line with the specified announcement, but also significant impact, since CRAs’ action 
are definitely correlated, and this means markets will react differently if they are waiting 
for an Agency to adjust its rating or not. The third variables, Warning, directly refers to 
the overestimation effect discussed in the descriptive analysis: it reports whether in the 
previous 6 months the rating change was preceded by a watchlist movement in the same 
direction. Obviously, this variable is available only for those announcements 
comprehending an actual downgrade or upgrade. According to the hypothesis made in 
last section, we expect Warning to have a coefficient sign opposite to the type of 
announcement, because of its rebalancing function; furthermore, we expect the impact 
to be significantly stronger in the post announcement phase, in line with the graphical 
analysis shown in Figure 4 and Figure 6. 
We also included two more dummy variables on the right-hand-side of the regression 
model. Euro takes into account whether the event happened after the creation of the 
Euro zone. We expect that there might exist more spill-over effects caused by the event 
when the country uses the same currency as some neighboring countries, hence the 
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event country could face smaller impact on its abnormal market returns than on the 
simple market returns. This indicates that, in negative events, the regression coefficients 
for Euro in the models employing abnormal market returns as the dependent variable 
might be larger than those in models using simple returns; for positive events previous 
literature
9
 does not find significant impact, and for this reason we do not expect 
particular differences among simple and abnormal returns. Moreover institutional 
organizations, like the BCE, are very influential, because of their support and control 
role in the monetary union. Hence event countries in the Euro zone might suffer less 
from negative impacts on both of its abnormal market return and simple market return. 
This effect however may be counterbalanced if rating changes are close one to another: 
in the same way other countries can share the impact of announcements in the event 
country, the same is true also in the other way round. This is what happened during the 
Financial Crisis: past months saw more than once group downgrades or watchlist 
movements in the same day. We use dummy variable Crisis to show if the event 
happened after the current financial crisis begun, assuming as starting point September 
2008. For the above mentioned reason, and for the systematic bearish impact of the 
crisis, we expect that the coefficient will be in line with the announcement, and 
particularly significant in case of downgrades. 
 
5.2 Regression results 
Table 2 exhibits the results we reached. Panel A, B, C and D show the results for the 
four subsamples of rating decrease, negative watchlist, rating increase and positive 
watchlist respectively. Before discussing in detail the results in each of these panels, we 
                                                 
9
 See M. Ferreira & P. Gama (2007) and A. Gande & D. Parsley (2005) 
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should make a couple of considerations: first, a general trend consistent with 
conclusions reached in the descriptive analysis pops out at first sight, namely the 
predominance of positive watchlist-related announcements; then, the predictive power 
among all the different equations is not particularly high (average R-squared slightly 
below 15%), and this may imply some limitations for our results. 
Panel A focuses on downgrades. The constant γ is almost always positive (though not 
statically significant), except in the post announcement window: in absence of all the 
other variables, markets on average negatively react to this kind of news only after the 
event day. The two variables News and First present the same pattern: negative 
coefficients in all the windows, except [+1; +20] (First is also positive in Model 2, 
however we consider it negligible due its particularly high p-value). This is in line with 
our earlier observation in Figure 3 on how the impact related to such an announcement 
is only negative in the short term, and immediately followed by a positive recovering 
trend. This means a positive relation with how unexpected the news is, only serves to 
counterbalance previous movements. Moreover, News coefficients can rely on statistical 
significance in Model 1 (p-value of 7.4%) and 3 (p-value of 9.2%). In line with our 
expectations, Warning presents a large positive coefficient in [+1; +20], however this 
specific test for the overestimate hypothesis does not reach statistical significance, as 
already happened for downgrades in descriptive analysis. Moving to the other dummy 
variables, consistent with our expectations, Euro has positive slopes in case of abnormal 
returns. However, it has negative coefficients in the short-term windows, based on 
simple returns. This temporary effect may be related to the absence of the benchmark 
from the event study: since simple returns may reflect also cross-country effects, 
belonging to a bigger institution can amplify the downgrading effect, and offset the 
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impact previously described. Instead, the magnifying argument occurs in all the Crisis 
coefficients, consistently with our expectations. 
Panel B enters the discussion about negative watchlisting. If we look at γ values, they 
are the opposite of the ones from Panel A, which means we can use the opposite 
explanation: since the markets quickly recover from the news, CRAs’ action is more 
likely to be a reaction to previous negative trends. Focusing on surprise variables, we 
reached consistent results in case of News, with always negative coefficients, significant 
at 5% (Model 5 and 8) and 10% (Model 6). Instead, First shows coefficients mostly not 
in line with our expectations, with the only exception of Model 5; however, particularly 
high p-values do not allows us to be confident this variable would have such impact. 
Moving to the last two variables, we reached results in line with our expectations for 
both Euro (except Model 7) and Crisis, which means positive coefficients for the 
former, and negative coefficients for the latter.  
So far we dealt with negative announcements; Panel C moves the topic to positive news, 
precisely upgrades. The most surprising result comes from the constant, which is 
negative for all the event windows, and also significant at 10% in Model 12. This means 
that, according to this model, all the positive impact of upgrades, if any, is incorporated 
in surprise variables. First exactly behaves according to this proposition: its positive 
coefficients are significant at 1% (Model 9), 5% (Model 10) and 10% (Model 11 and 
12). Instead, News somehow differentiates itself, since its coefficients are positive for 
Model 11 and 12, but negative for Model 9 and 10. A possible explanation concerns the 
timing of the impact: the temporary negative relation may be due to price stickiness
10
; 
namely, the amplified positive movements 20 days before and after the event would 
                                                 
10
 The same argument used by Ferri et al. (1999), even if it focused more on the relation between ratings 
and crisis periods. 
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require an even higher peak immediately close to day 0, but the line stays flatter because 
prices already reached an adequate level. The third surprise variable, Warning, allows us 
to observe one of the most important results obtained in this paper, which is the negative 
relation of market anticipation (namely, positive watchlisting) over abnormal returns 
after an upgrade announcement. The coefficients are always negative, and also 
significant in the event day at 10%, and in the post announcement phase at 1%. Notice 
this last coefficient is not only supported by significance, but represents also a very 
large impact (-6.725). Next, Euro and Crisis present coefficients with a different sign 
than what expected; the latter may be due to widespread fear for the future within the 
markets, and a rising distrust in CRAs’ actions.  
Last, Panel 4 deals with positive watchlisting. First thing to notice, this set of 
regressions presents only variables News and Euro. As far as concerning First, none of 
the observations occurred within three months after another CRAs’ action, and for this 
reason the model considers it as a constant. For Crisis, similarly, only two observations 
happened after 2008, and because of this low number and partial correlation with Euro, 
the variable did not allow us to gather insights without mistakenly altering the model. 
Following the same path of the other Panels, we find the constant γ: in line with our 
expectations, it is always positive, and significant at 10% in Model 14. The variable 
News confirms the coefficients previously discussed for upgrades, already related to the 
hypothesis of price stickiness to a certain threshold. Moving to the remaining variable, 
Euro is in line with our forecasts, and in Model 14 the coefficient of -4.745 is also 
significant at 5% level. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper tries to uncover what kind of role the CRAs have within financial markets, in 
order to foster the discussion concerning how should institutions solve a situation that, 
once again during current crisis, has shown all of its weaknesses. First of all, in line 
with many other academic studies, our analysis confirmed that in many cases stock 
market returns are subject to direct relation to these announcements,  and in particular 
markets are more affected by the possibility in the short run of a rating variation, than 
the moment in which this news becomes concrete. This generates counterbalancing 
trends, acting as a source of both instability in the economy and discretional power in 
the hands of CRAs. Moreover, how widespread the impact becomes, is directly related 
to the surprise element within the announcement. One can argue this implies that these 
agencies are considered bearer of private information, new to the markets’ knowledge. 
Both these conclusions bring an important question: to what extent should few 
organizations be entitled of such an incredible influence over delicate topics, able to 
define a country’s future? 
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Table 2 – Regression Results 
Event Panel A: Rating Decrease Panel B: Negative Watchlist 
MODEL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Event Window 0 -1; +1 +1: +20 -20; 0 0 -1; +1 +1: +20 -20; 0 
Independent Ret. CR CAR CAR Ret. CR CAR CAR 
    
  
    
  
  
Dependent   
  
    
  
  
CONST 0.567 1.582 -2.068 0.889 -0.162 -2.051 6.248* -3.431 
News -0.140* -0.073 0.284* -0.178 -0.245** -0.374* -0.04 -0.725** 
First -0.061 0.053 1.951 -0.219 -0.454 0.159 0.055 1.346 
Warning 0.441 0.656 1.70 -0.277 - - - - 
Euro -0.211 -1.476 0.144 0.311 1.873 3.713 -3.848 4.707 
Crisis -0.212 -0.676 -2.109 -0.232 -0.902 -1.575 -3.107 -0.958 
    
  
    
  
  
R² 7.40% 5.60% 8.10% 1.90% 13.30% 7.70% 11.10% 10.00% 
N 80 80 80 80 52 52 52 52 
 
 
Event  Panel C: Rating Increase Panel D: Positive Watchlist 
MODEL 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Event Window 0 -1; +1 +1: +20 -20; 0 0 -1; +1 +1: +20 -20; 0 
Independent Ret. CR CAR CAR Ret. CR CAR CAR 
    
  
    
  
  
Dependent   
  
    
  
  
CONST -0.364 -0.725 -2.081 -3.02* 0.703 2.278* 2.148 1.753 
News -0.346 -0.300 1.473 0.539 -0.873 -2.842 1.118 1.314 
First 1.341*** 1.742** 2.929* 3.026* NA NA NA NA 
Warning -0.929* -1.061 -6.795*** 0.238 - - - - 
Euro 0.362 0.125 -2.758* 0.568 -0.665 -4.745** -2.48 -3.702 
Crisis -0.340 -0.123 -3.337 -1.394 NA NA NA NA 
    
  
    
  
  
R² 23.10% 12.20% 29.50% 7.30% 8.20% 43.20% 14.00% 14.50% 
N 62 62 62 62 13 13 13 13 
 
Ret.: Simple Daily Return   -   CR: Cumulative Return   -   CAR: Cumulative Abnormal Return 
 
News: Number of Bloomberg News   -   First: First Mover Dummy   -   Warning: Preceded by Watchlist 
Euro: European Union Creation Dummy   -   Crisis: Financial Crisis Dummy   
 
*: significant at 10%   -   **: significant at 5%   -   ***: significant at 1% 
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Figure 1 – Cumulative Returns in [-20; +20]: Negative Announcements 
  
 
Figure 2 – Cumulative Returns in [-20; +20]: Positive Announcements 
 
 
Figure 3 – CAR in [-20; +20]: All Negative Announcements 
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Figure 4 – CAR in [-20; +20]: Downgrades with and without previous warning, 
and Negative Watchlist 
 
 
Figure 5 – CAR in [-20; +20]: All Positive Announcements 
 
 
Figure 6 – CAR in [-20; +20]: Upgrades with and without previous warning, and 
Positive Watchlist 
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APPENDIX: DATA GENERATION – ABNORMAL RETURNS 
To calculate the impact of rating variation in terms of abnormal returns, first of all a 
benchmark is required. The benchmark in this study is represented by a time series 
regression of the MSCI index of each country of interest, over the European MSCI 
index, performed on the 250 trading days before the event. The equation can be easily 
identified as the following: 
 𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼𝐸𝑈 + 𝑖  
The event study methodology requires that the outcomes of this regression, namely the 
slope and the intercept, should be used to compare the performance of the countries’ 
indexes, within the event window, to the previous performance. In this way it becomes 
possible to analyze if it was influenced somehow by the event. More precisely, 
abnormal returns are calculated according to the formula: 
 𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑖 − 𝛼?̂? − 𝛽?̂? ∗ 𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼𝐸𝑈  
Starting from abnormal returns, the analysis briefly includes some descriptive statistic 
measures, which are then used to statistically test the significance of the results. We 
defined the test statistic as: 
 
𝑍 =  √𝑁 ∗
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑠𝑡
 ~ 𝑡𝑁−1  
The average abnormal return 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 is the arithmetic average of all the abnormal returns 
over the N number of events (in day t), while the volatility estimator 𝑠𝑡 takes in account 
we consider part of the population as representative for the overall sample. This test is 
directly related to the assumption that abnormal returns follow a normal distribution 
with mean zero and variance 𝜎2. 
A similar rationale was extended to cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), defined as the 
sum of abnormal returns in a specific time period. In this case the test statistic becomes: 
 
𝛷 = √𝑁 ∗
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅[𝑡1;𝑡2]
𝑠
 ~ 𝑁(0,1)   
Again, it uses the arithmetic average of all cumulative abnormal returns between a 
window [𝑡1; 𝑡2] and a volatility estimator s, with N-1 degrees of freedom. 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
APPENDIX: Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and P-Values 
[*: significant at 10%   -   **: significant at 5%   -   ***: significant at 1%] 
 
NEGATIVE VARIATION POSITIVE VARIATION 
Day DECREASE NEG.WATCHLIST ALL INCREASE POS.WATCHLIST ALL 
-20 
Ret. P-value Ret. P-value Ret. P-value Ret. P-value Ret. P-value Ret. P-value 
-0.17% 0.14 0.03% 0.42 -0.09% 0.21 -0.07% 0.35 0.18% 0.14 -0.04% 0.41 
-19 0.13% 0.22 -0.02% 0.47 0.07% 0.28 0.01% 0.47 0.05% 0.40 0.02% 0.44 
-18 -0.09% 0.29 -0.30%** 0.03 -0.17%* 0.07 0.04% 0.37 0.08% 0.36 0.05% 0.33 
-17 -0.05% 0.32 -0.25% 0.10 -0.13% 0.11 0.12% 0.18 0.34% 0.22 0.16% 0.11 
-16 0.05% 0.38 -0.12% 0.17 -0.01% 0.46 0.02% 0.45 0.20% 0.23 0.04% 0.36 
-15 0.17% 0.14 -0.33%** 0.05 -0.01% 0.46 -0.05% 0.38 -0.15% 0.28 -0.06% 0.32 
-14 0.00% 0.49 0.19% 0.15 0.07% 0.27 0.04% 0.41 -0.15% 0.30 0.01% 0.48 
-13 -0.10% 0.21 0.07% 0.38 -0.04% 0.36 -0.10% 0.18 0.48% 0.12 -0.01% 0.47 
-12 -0.03% 0.43 0.25%* 0.07 0.08% 0.27 0.18% 0.12 0.34% 0.17 0.21%* 0.07 
-11 0.23%** 0.05 0.08% 0.38 0.17%* 0.08 -0.14% 0.11 -0.07% 0.38 -0.13%* 0.10 
-10 0.08% 0.32 -0.08% 0.33 0.02% 0.44 0.02% 0.43 -0.58%** 0.03 -0.07% 0.28 
-9 0.09% 0.27 -0.05% 0.40 0.04% 0.36 -0.02% 0.47 -0.24% 0.25 -0.05% 0.38 
-8 -0.30%** 0.04 0.02% 0.47 -0.18%* 0.08 0.03% 0.40 0.27%*** 0.01 0.07% 0.25 
-7 0.00% 0.50 -0.07% 0.38 -0.03% 0.41 0.00% 0.50 -0.07% 0.39 -0.01% 0.47 
-6 -0.11% 0.24 -0.26% 0.11 -0.16%* 0.09 0.06% 0.36 0.12% 0.34 0.07% 0.31 
-5 -0.16% 0.17 0.14% 0.23 -0.05% 0.35 0.06% 0.37 0.06% 0.40 0.06% 0.35 
-4 0.14% 0.15 0.14% 0.26 0.14% 0.12 0.09% 0.26 -0.03% 0.47 0.07% 0.28 
-3 0.02% 0.46 -0.05% 0.39 -0.01% 0.48 0.07% 0.35 0.14% 0.26 0.08% 0.30 
-2 -0.04% 0.39 -0.02% 0.47 -0.03% 0.40 -0.15%* 0.10 -0.29%** 0.04 -0.17%** 0.04 
-1 -0.06% 0.38 -0.25%* 0.07 -0.13% 0.16 -0.16%* 0.09 0.01% 0.48 -0.13%* 0.10 
0 -0.05% 0.39 -0.41%** 0.02 -0.19%* 0.10 0.01% 0.48 0.41% 0.15 0.07% 0.29 
1 -0.05% 0.35 -0.18% 0.18 -0.10% 0.19 -0.09% 0.24 -0.59% 0.17 -0.17% 0.12 
2 0.39%** 0.02 -0.10% 0.31 0.21%* 0.07 0.01% 0.47 0.04% 0.42 0.02% 0.46 
3 -0.14% 0.21 0.05% 0.41 -0.07% 0.31 -0.01% 0.47 0.21% 0.27 0.02% 0.44 
4 0.24%* 0.06 -0.02% 0.45 0.14% 0.13 -0.15% 0.11 0.08% 0.37 -0.12% 0.14 
5 -0.15% 0.18 0.11% 0.32 -0.06% 0.34 0.21%** 0.05 0.11% 0.29 0.20%** 0.04 
6 0.09% 0.29 -0.02% 0.47 0.05% 0.35 -0.18%** 0.05 -0.22% 0.17 -0.19%** 0.03 
7 0.18% 0.11 0.10% 0.33 0.15% 0.11 -0.17%* 0.10 -0.38%* 0.06 -0.21%** 0.04 
8 0.17% 0.12 -0.02% 0.46 0.10% 0.19 -0.06% 0.32 -0.26% 0.27 -0.09% 0.23 
9 0.04% 0.41 -0.15% 0.17 -0.03% 0.38 -0.21% 0.04 0.22% 0.23 -0.14%* 0.10 
10 -0.02% 0.45 0.46%*** 0.01 0.16%* 0.09 -0.38%*** 0.00 0.51%** 0.05 -0.24%*** 0.01 
11 -0.04% 0.38 -0.02% 0.44 -0.03% 0.37 -0.02% 0.43 0.45%* 0.07 0.05% 0.30 
12 -0.15% 0.19 0.01% 0.48 -0.09% 0.25 -0.16% 0.13 -0.41% 0.16 -0.20%* 0.07 
13 0.05% 0.35 -0.46%*** 0.01 -0.14%* 0.09 -0.17%* 0.10 -0.15% 0.29 -0.16%* 0.08 
14 0.16% 0.14 -0.15% 0.23 0.04% 0.35 -0.12% 0.21 0.08% 0.35 -0.09% 0.25 
15 -0.10% 0.22 -0.19% 0.12 -0.13%* 0.09 0.00% 0.50 0.25% 0.13 0.04% 0.38 
16 0.06% 0.32 0.37% 0.12 0.18% 0.11 0.01% 0.46 0.27% 0.14 0.05% 0.34 
17 -0.21%* 0.06 0.11% 0.28 -0.09% 0.21 -0.21%* 0.07 0.17% 0.23 -0.15% 0.11 
18 -0.04% 0.38 -0.04% 0.37 -0.04% 0.33 -0.08% 0.29 -0.15% 0.30 -0.09% 0.24 
19 -0.10% 0.24 0.20% 0.25 0.01% 0.47 0.15% 0.13 0.76%** 0.02 0.25%** 0.03 
20 -0.30%** 0.03 0.12% 0.29 -0.15% 0.13 0.01% 0.47 0.82%*** 0.00 0.14% 0.18 
 
